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THE PLIGHT OF THE PATAGONIAN
TOOTHFISH: LESSONS FROM THE
VOLGA CASE
I. INTRODUCTION

W

arnings from policy makers, scientists, fishing communities, and environmental groups have recently increased in pitch: the oceans once thought to contain limitless,
renewable bounties of fish are, in fact, in a state of crisis.1 Evidence of the widespread dwindling and collapsing of fish populations is dangerous to ignore.2 One source estimates that 70
percent of the world’s commercial fisheries have been fully exploited, overexploited, or depleted.3 Although various factors
contribute to the depletion of the oceans’ fish, such as pollution,
climate change, and mistaken understandings of marine ecosystems, overfishing by human beings is a major cause of fish depopulation.4 Certain species are dangerously overfished, in
1. See generally William J. Broad & Andrew C. Revkin, Has the Sea Given
Up Its Bounty?: Overfishing Imposes a Heavy Toll, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2003,
at F1 (Science Times); SYLVIA A. EARLE, SEA CHANGE: A MESSAGE OF THE
OCEANS (1995) 168–97; PEW OCEANS COMM’N, AMERICA’S LIVING OCEANS:
CHARTING A COURSE FOR SEA CHANGE—A REPORT TO THE NATION:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A NEW OCEAN POLICY, 35–48 (May 2003), available at
http://www.pewoceans.org/; Ambassador Mary Beth West, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Oceans and Fisheries, Statement before the Subcommittee on Fisheries Conservation, Wildlife, and Oceans, House Committee on
Resources, U.S. Dep’t St., Promoting Sustainable International Fisheries
Worldwide, May 22, 2003 [hereinafter Dep’t St. Oceans and Fisheries], available at http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/rm/2003/20952pf.htm.
2. See EARLE, supra note 1, at 169 (“[T]he ocean cannot sustain the massive removal of wildlife needed to keep Japan and other nations supplied with
present levels of food taken from the sea.”); PEW OCEANS COMM’N, supra note
1, at 73 (“[D]emand for seafood is rising, yet the total global wild fisheries
catch has leveled out since the mid-1990s as fish stocks have become depleted.
In the U.S., 30 percent of the known wild fishery stocks are already overfished
or in the process of being depleted through overfishing.”); Dep’t St. Oceans
and Fisheries, supra note 1 (“Many of the world’s primary fishery resources
are under stress. A number of key fish stocks have collapsed from overfishing
and environmental degradation . . . while others have become depleted.”).
3. Broad & Revkin, supra note 1.
4. Press Release, “Who Plays by the Fisheries Rules?”—Commission
Launches Public Compliance Scoreboard on the Internet, European Commission Press Room, IP/03/841, at 1 (June 16, 2003) [hereinafter Who Plays by the
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large part due to illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing
(IUU fishing).5 IUU fishing can have a devastating impact on
already-fragile fish populations; it can cause the collapse of a
fishery, or significantly undermine efforts to rebuild depleted
stocks.6 Patagonian toothfish (toothfish), commonly known in
the United States as Chilean sea bass, are threatened by ramFisheries Rules?], available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/fisheries/news_corn
er/press/inf03_22_en.htm.
Overfishing occurs when “fish are killed faster than they can reproduce….” Tim Eichenberg & Mitchell Shapson, The Promise of Johannesburg:
Fisheries and the World Summit on Sustainable Development, 34 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 587, 596 (2004). In the opinion of nineteen prominent scientists, “ecological extinction caused by overfishing preceded all other human
disturbance to coastal ecosystems, including pollution, degradation of water
quality, and anthropogenic climate change.” Id. In 2003, the European
Commission observed that 76% of all fisheries-related infringement procedures brought against member states could be attributed to overfishing claims
in contravention of fisheries obligations, despite the imminent collapse of certain fish stocks. Who Plays by the Fisheries Rules?, supra.
5. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (“FAO”), the term “IUU fishing” describes various activities:
Some IUU fishers operate in areas where fishing is not permitted.
Some employ banned technologies, outlawed net types, or flaunt fishing regulations in other ways. Others under-report how big their
catches are—or don’t report them at all. In some cases, in fact,
catches of commercially-valuable fish species may be surpassing
permitted levels by over 300 percent due to IUU fishing . . . .
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FAO Calls for Intensified Action to Combat Illegal Fishing, FAO Newsroom, Dec. 3, 2003 [hereinafter FAO Newsroom], available at http://www.fao.org/english/newroom/
news/2003/25379-en.html.
6. International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal,
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations, para. 1, June 23, 2001 [hereinafter IPOA-IUU], available
at http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/y1224e/y1224e00.htm. A recent U.N. General Assembly resolution echoed this concern:
Concerned that illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing threatens
seriously to deplete populations of certain fish species and significantly damage marine ecosystems and that illegal, unreported and
unregulated fishing has a detrimental impact on sustainable fisheries, including the food security and the economies of many States . . . .
th
G.A. Res. 142, U.N. GAOR, 57 Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/142 (2003),
available at http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/547/60/PDF/N02
54760.pdf?OpenElement. See also FAO Newsroom, supra note 5 (“In some
cases, in fact, catches of commercially-valuable fish species may be surpassing
permitted levels by over 300 percent due to IUU fishing. . . .”).
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pant IUU fishing.7 Several international and regional organizations regulate IUU fishing in regions where toothfish poaching
occurs. Unfortunately, enforcement problems encumber conservation measures established under these instruments, making it difficult to stop IUU fishing.
The primary international instrument governing the law of
the sea, including the conservation of living marine resources, is
the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS or Convention),8 which was adopted in 1982 and entered into force in 1994.9 UNCLOS is a vital instrument with
strong conservationist goals.10 It is therefore lamentable that
the tribunal established under UNCLOS to hear fishing disputes has given insufficient consideration to these fundamental
conservationist objectives. In a series of judgments ending with
the Volga case,11 the International Tribunal of the Law of the
Sea (Tribunal or ITLOS)12 narrowly interpreted key UNCLOS

7. See generally TRAFFIC Lauds Detention of Suspected ‘Pirate’ Toothfish
Fishing Vessel, but the Chase Must Continue: Greater International Cooperation Needed in Addressing Illegal Fisheries, TRAFFIC Network, Aug. 28,
2003, available at http://www.traffic.org/news/pirate_toothfish.html (“Patagonian Toothfish is highly valued in restaurants in Japan and the USA . . . ,
which are the largest consumer markets for Patagonian Toothfish, followed by
Canada and the EU …. TRAFFIC studies revealed that IUU catch may account for half of all Patagonian Toothfish traded internationally . . . .”).
8. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS], available at http://www.un.org.Depts/
los/convention_agreemetns/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf. One author describes
UNCLOS as the “constitution of the oceans.” Montserrat Gorina-Ysern, World
Ocean Public Trust: High Seas Fisheries After Grotius—Towards a New Ocean
Ethos?, 34 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 645, 671 (2004).
9. The Oceans Are the Very Foundation of Human Life, UNCLOS website,
at http://www.un.org/depts/los/oceans_foundation.htm (last visited Nov. 13,
2004).
10. The Convention’s preamble conveys the intention of member states to
“promote the peaceful uses of the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient
utilization of their resources, the conservation of their living resources, and
the study, protection and preservation of the marine environment. . . .”
UNCLOS, supra note 8, at 25 (preamble) [hereinafter UNCLOS Preamble].
11. The “Volga” Case (Russian Fed’n v. Australia), ITLOS Case No. 11
(2002), available at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (last visited Oct. 10,
2004).
12. ITLOS is “an independent judicial body established by the Convention
to adjudicate disputes arising out of the interpretation and application of the
Convention.” General Information—Overview, International Tribunal for the
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enforcement and dispute resolution provisions. This restrictive
interpretation created an additional obstacle for coastal states13
seeking to deter and punish IUU fishing inside their national
waters. The negative impact of these judgments is twofold:
first, they diminish an individual state’s power to punish and
deter IUU fishing within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ).14
Second, the judgments interfere with regional organizations’
efforts to deter IUU fishing in defined areas. The Commission
for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources
(CCAMLR) is a regional organization that regulates toothfish
harvesting in the Antarctic waters.15
Although UNCLOS
strongly encourages regional cooperation among its members to
conserve natural resources,16 the Volga line of cases undermines
certain CCAMLR toothfish conservation measures.17
Law of the Sea, ITLOS website [hereinafter Overview ITLOS], at http://
www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2004).
13. The term “coastal state” in this Note refers to coastal states that are
parties to UNCLOS.
14. UNCLOS delineates the EEZ as follows: “The exclusive economic zone
shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is measured.” UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 57.
UNCLOS grants states sovereign rights to regulate fishing within their EEZs.
Id. arts. 56(1), 61–62.
15. CCAMLR manages the commercial fishing of toothfish in the Antarctic
and sub-Antarctic regions. Patagonian Toothfish: Fact Sheet, Coalition of
Legal Toothfish Operators website [hereinafter COLTO Fact Sheet], available
at http://www.colto.org/Background_Toothfish.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2004).
The CCAMLR Convention is an international fisheries instrument that entered into force on April 7, 1982, and has twenty-four members: Argentina,
Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, European Community, Namibia, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Russia, South Africa, France, Germany, India, Italy,
Japan, Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United
States, and Uruguay. NAT’L ENVTL. TR., BLACK MARKET FOR WHITE GOLD:
ILLEGAL TRADE IN CHILEAN SEA BASS 3 (2004) [hereinafter BLACK MARKET FOR
WHITE GOLD], available at http://www.net.org/reports/csb_report.pdf.
16. UNCLOS provides:
States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards
and recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional features.
UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 197.
17. See infra Part IV.C–D. for a discussion of the impact of Volga on
CCAMLR conservation measures.
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The disputing states in the Volga case, the Russian Federation and Australia, were both parties to UNCLOS and the
CCAMLR Convention at the time of the events leading to their
dispute.18 The Volga, a Russian-owned fishing vessel flying the
Russian Federation’s flag, had obtained a commercial license to
fish within the Russian Federation’s EEZ, in the open sea, and
in the coastal zones of foreign states.19 Australian authorities
observed the Volga fleeing from Australia’s EEZ, boarded it,20
and discovered 131,422 tons of illegally-caught toothfish.21 Australian authorities pursued enforcement measures available to
them under Australian law; they imposed financial and nonfinancial conditions for the release of the Volga22 and brought
criminal charges against the master and crew.23 With regard to
the boat, Russia argued that Australia’s conditions of release
were unreasonable vis-à-vis UNCLOS Article 73(2), which requires the “prompt release” of vessels upon the posting of a
“reasonable bond.”24 ITLOS, narrowly interpreting Articles

18. The “Volga” Case, Separate Opinion of Judge Cot, para. 5; (stating that
by April 1997, both countries had ratified UNCLOS), available at
http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2004). The facts of
the Volga case are provided in greater detail infra Part IV.B.
19. The “Volga” Case. paras. 30–31. A flag state is “[t]he state in which a
fishing vessel is registered.” BLACK MARKET FOR WHITE GOLD, supra note 15,
at 4. A flag state has the power to regulate the fishing activities of a ship
flying its flag. See Ian J. Popick, Comment, Are There Really Plenty of Fish in
the Sea? The World Trade Organization’s Presence is Effectively Frustrating
the International Community’s Attempts to Conserve the Chilean Sea Bass, 50
EMORY L.J. 939, 964 (2001). UNCLOS requires that nationals of other states
fishing inside a coastal state’s EEZ “comply with the conservation measures
and with the other terms and conditions established in the laws and regulations of the coastal State.” UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 62(4). FAO is concerned with the phenomenon of “flags of convenience,” in which states allow
vessels from other states to fly their flags, yet fail to ensure that these vessels
respect fishing laws. FAO Newsroom, supra note 5.
20. The “Volga” Case, para. 32.
21. Id. para. 51.
22. For details of the conditions of release, see infra Part IV.B.
23. The “Volga” Case, paras. 40–46.
24. UNCLOS Article 73 provides:
1. The coastal State may, in the exercise of its sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage the living resources in the excusive economic zone, take such measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings, as may be necessary to ensure
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73(2) and 292, agreed with Russia that Australia’s conditions of
release were unreasonable.25
The Tribunal’s interpretation of UNCLOS Articles 73(2) and
292 is likely to impede Australia’s efforts to deter IUU fishing
within its EEZ, and is therefore at odds with the Convention’s
central conservationist objectives.26 For Australia to deter IUU
fishing, it must be allowed to set conditions of release of a vessel
that create a financial disincentive to IUU fishers. Foreign
poachers reap ample rewards in the marketplace for illegallycaught toothfish.27 If the cost of obtaining the release of a vessel
is relatively inconsequential compared to IUU fishing profits,
IUU fishing will continue.28
compliance with the laws and regulations adopted by it in conformity
with this Convention.
2. Arrested vessels and their crews shall be promptly released upon
the posting of reasonable bond or other security.
3. Coastal State penalties for violations of fisheries laws and regulations in the exclusive economic zone may not include imprisonment,
in the absence of agreements to the contrary by the States concerned,
or any other form of corporal punishment.
4. In cases of arrest or detention of foreign vessels the coastal State
shall promptly notify the flag State, through appropriate channels, of
the action taken and of any penalties subsequently imposed.
UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 73.
25. The “Volga” Case, para. 88 (“[T]he Tribunal considers that the bond as
sought by Australia is not reasonable within the meaning of article 292 of the
Convention.”). UNCLOS provides: “Upon the posting of the bond or other
financial security determined by the court or tribunal, the authorities of the
detaining State shall comply promptly with the decision of the court or tribunal concerning the release of the vessel or its crew.” UNCLOS, supra note 8,
art. 292(4). For the full text of Article 292, which contains the dispute resolution procedures for prompt release cases, see infra note 81.
26. UNCLOS Preamble, supra note 10.
27. See BLACK MARKET FOR WHITE GOLD, supra note 15, at 7 (“With dockside prices ranging as high as $10.00 to $12.00 per pound, toothfish has rapidly become one of the most lucrative, illegal fishing target species globally: a
good haul can bring $3 million.”).
28. This Note does not ignore the right of foreign vessels accused of IUU
fishing to be free from arbitrary or excessive punishment. Rather, it argues
that in the Volga line of cases, ITLOS unnecessarily tipped the scales in favor
of foreign pirate fishers. The tension between a foreign state’s right to
UNCLOS’s procedural remedies and a coastal state’s right to punish IUU
fishing is aptly characterized as “the complex balance between due process
and due deterrence.” Gorina-Ysern, supra note 8, at 687–88.
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Part II of this Note provides the background to the toothfish
crisis. Part III surveys UNCLOS enforcement and dispute resolution provisions pertaining to IUU fishing, in particular Articles 73 and 292. It also introduces the CCAMLR Convention,
and highlights some of its shortcomings.29 Part IV examines the
Volga case, the latest in a line of prompt release cases heard by
the Tribunal. It focuses on the Tribunal’s interpretation of key
UNCLOS provisions, Articles 73 and 292, and the impact of its
interpretation on coastal states’ efforts to combat IUU fishing of
toothfish. Part V explores alternative, broader interpretations
of Article 73(2) to be applied in future prompt release cases.
These interpretations are more consistent with UNCLOS’s
strong conservationist spirit and with the sovereign rights it
confers on coastal states, without favoring the rights of coastal
states over those of flag states. Part VI, the conclusion, suggests amending UNCLOS Article 73(2) to cure the incompatibility of the Tribunal’s extant interpretation of Article 73(2) and
the dire need to prevent toothfish depletion.
II. THE PLIGHT OF THE PATAGONIAN TOOTHFISH
Toothfish are deep-sea fish found in the waters of Antarctica
which can live up to fifty years and grow to over two hundred
pounds.30 Toothfish are overfished and illegally fished,31 to the
extent that some believe they are on the “brink of extinction.”32
29. Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources,
May 20, 1980, 33 U.S.T. 3476, 19 I.L.M. 841 (1980) [hereinafter CCAMLR
Convention], available at http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/pubs/bd/toc.htm.
30. News Release, Illegal Harvests of Chilean Sea Bass Get Close Review:
U.S. Aggressively Monitoring Imports; Issues Consumer Fact Sheet, National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, NOAA 2002-031, Mar. 25, 2002,
[hereinafter NOAA News Release], available at http://www.publicaffairs.
noaa.gov/releases2002/mar02/noaa0231.html. Two kinds of toothfish are sold
in the United States under the name Chilean sea bass: Patagonian toothfish
(Dissostichus eleginoides) and Antarctic toothfish (Dissostichus mawsoni),
which is similar to Patagonian toothfish, although smaller and found in colder
waters. BLACK MARKET FOR WHITE GOLD, supra note 15, at 3. CCAMLR regulates both varieties. Id. at 10.
31. Joint U.S. Dep’t of Commerce/U.S. Dep’t of State Fact Sheet: Chilean
Sea Bass Frequently Asked Questions, Mar. 26, 2002 [hereinafter Fact Sheet:
Chilean Sea Bass], available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/trade/chile.pdf.
32. Associated Press, Australia Sends Armed Ship to Protect Patagonian
Toothfish, Dec. 17, 2003, http://www.flmnh.ufl.edu/fish/innews/armedtooth
2003.html; Australia Arms Toothfish Patrol, BBC NEWS WORLD EDITION, Dec.
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Illegal fishing, in particular, undermines toothfish conservation
efforts.33 By one estimate, the Australian fishery will be gone in
five to fifteen years.34 Although CCAMLR tries to counter IUU
fishing by imposing allowable catch levels and other conservation measures, large quantities of toothfish are harvested using
banned fishing methods, and in excess of CCAMLR catch quotas.35
IUU fishing of toothfish is rampant for several reasons.36
First, it is easy for illegally-caught fish to saturate the market.37
Unless properly documented, they can be sold on the market by
virtue of mere possession, without marketable title conferred by
a valid fishing license.38 Over sixteen thousand tons of toothfish
were legally harvested in the Antarctic in 2000;39 some estimate
that up to twice that amount were illegally harvested.40 One
group estimates that almost 80 percent of toothfish sold in the

17, 2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/asia-pacific/3326851.
stm.
33. Illegal Fishing Continues to Threaten Patagonian Toothfish, TRAFFIC
Network, Aug. 14, 2001, available at http://www.traffic.org/toothfish/.
34. Fishing News International, Pacific Andes in Toothfish Storm, Jan.
2003, available at the Coalition of Legal Toothfish Operators, http://
www.colto.org/FishingNewsInt.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2004).
35. Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) Fishing, CCAMLR website,
at http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/E/sc/fish-monit/iuu-intro.htm (last visited Oct. 9,
2004) (“Substantial catches of toothfish (Dissostichus spp.) have been taken by
longline fishing well in excess of allowable catches agreed by the CCAMLR.”).
Longliners are vessels that lay baited, hooked lines of up to one mile in length
for approximately twenty-four hours before retrieving the catch. See Frequently Asked Questions, Division of Commercial Fisheries, Alaska Department of Fish and Game website, at http://cf.adfg.state.ak.us/geninfo/ab
out/faq/cf_faq.php (last visited Oct. 9, 2004).
36. This list of factors is not intended to be exhaustive.
37. See Lea Brilmayer & Natalie Klein, Land and Sea: Two Sovereignty
Regimes in Search of a Common Denominator, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
703, 752–53 (2001) (“Once the fish are taken to port, it is unlikely that any
buyer can determine whether the fish were lawfully taken from a particular
maritime area.”).
38. See id.
39. Fact Sheet: Chilean Sea Bass, supra note 31. Generally, legal fishing
occurs when a coastal state licenses fishing rights in its to foreign fishers,
granting them legal title to catch removed in compliance with the license. See
Brilmayer & Klein, supra note 37, at 752.
40. Fact Sheet: Chilean Sea Bass, supra note 31.
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world is illegally obtained.41 This can happen because buyers
cannot distinguish between lawfully and unlawfully harvested
fish.42 It is, moreover, unrealistic to expect restaurants and
their patrons to enquire whether their dinner was legally
caught.43
Another cause of rampant IUU fishing is the strong market
demand for toothfish. The major markets for toothfish are the
United States, Japan, and the European Union,44 with the
United States importing 15 to 20 percent of the world market.45
Market prices are high, earning toothfish the nickname “white

41. Jack Williams, Australians Nab Suspected Illegal Fishing Boat After
4,000-mile Chase, USATODAY.COM, Aug. 30, 2003, available at http://
www.usatoday.com/weather/resources/coldscience/2003-08-30-toothfishcaught_x.htm (citing figures provided by the National Environmental Trust in
Washington). See also Australia Arms Toothfish Patrol, BBC NEWS, supra
note 32 (“[P]oachers are thought to take more than four times the amount of
toothfish caught legally.”).
42. Brilmayer & Klein, supra note 37, at 752–53.
43. BLACK MARKET FOR WHITE GOLD, supra note 15, at 8 (“[I]t is virtually
impossible for a consumer in the U.S. to know if the Chilean Sea Bass they
[sic] purchase in a restaurant or grocery store is legal or illegal.”). The following excerpt from an interview presents one chef’s perspective on the overfishing crisis:
[Question:] There are concerns these days about fish, too, for example
about certain species that have been depleted.
[Answer:] As a chef, it’s tough to go into that war. Don’t eat swordfish tomorrow, but do you eat cod? It changes. Where I’m from, cod
is now overfished. It’s senseless for us to take a hard line on it. It’s
tough to be a Greenpeace man and a chef at the same time. In my
head, I would like to support all that, but we also have a restaurant
where we serve people to make them happy, and that’s the reality.
Hugo Lindgren, Questions for Marcus Samuelsson: Big Fish Story: The Ethiopian-born Swedish Chef is Going Japanese, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Oct. 26,
2003, at 25.
44. Fact Sheet: Chilean Sea Bass, supra note 31.
45. NOAA News Release, supra note 30. This figure pertains to legal imports only. Id. In general, U.S. seafood consumption is on the rise, with per
capita consumption reaching 15.6 per person in 2002, almost one pound more
from the 2001 level. Americans Ate More Seafood in 2002, Press Release No.
NOAA03-105, Sept. 10, 2003, NOAA website, available at http://www.nmfs.
noaa.gov/docs/2002consumption.pdf. According to the National Environmental Trust, the United States imported 85 percent of legally-caught
CCAMLR toothfish in 2003. BLACK MARKET FOR WHITE GOLD, supra note 15,
at 11.
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gold.”46 On the docks, prices are as high as $10.00 to $12.00 per
pound.47 Clearly, there is financial incentive for pirate fishers to
ignore the risks involved with illegal activities.48 A dramatic
example of such risk-taking occurred in 2003, when Australian
authorities pursued a pirate fishing boat for twenty-one days
through 4,000 miles of the stormy, icy Southern Ocean.49 Australian authorities captured the boat, which contained illegallycaught toothfish,50 the estimated value of which was as high as
one million U.S. dollars.51
Finally, some states are simply unable to patrol their EEZs,
leaving the door wide open to poachers.52 Developing countries,
in particular, lack the financial and technological resources
necessary to deter IUU fishing. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) encourages states to
assist developing countries in meeting their obligations under
international and regional instruments.53

46. M. Lack & G. Sant, Patagonian Toothfish: Are Conservation and Trade
Measures Working?, TRAFFIC Network, at http://www.traffic.org/news/
displayPR.cfm?prID=32 (last visited Oct. 9, 2004); Swashbuckling Customs
Officials Land a Big Catch: Pirate Vessel Nabbed in High Seas Chase, World
Wildlife Fund Newsroom, Aug. 28, 2003 [hereinafter Swashbuckling Customs], available at http://worldwildlife.org.news/displayPR.cfm?prID=32 (last
visited Nov. 18, 2004). See also Media Alert: Another Toothfish Pirate Caught
Red Handed in Australian Waters—Spanish and Ghanian Governments
Urged to Take Immediate Action, Oct. 6, 2003, available at http://
www.colto.org/COLTO_MA_6_October03.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2004)
[hereinafter COLTO Media Alert] (“[I]t has been estimated that over 20,350
tonnes of toothfish was taken illegally from Australian waters between
1995/96 and 2001/2002. At a value of $US 10 per kilo for processed fish, this
means that around $AUS 300, million [sic] of Australian fish has been stolen
by these pirates.”).
47. BLACK MARKET FOR WHITE GOLD, supra note 15, at 7.
48. Chris Masters, Reporter, The Toothfish Pirates (transcript of television
broadcast by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Sept. 9, 2002), ABC
Online, at http://www.abc.net.au//4corners/archives/2002b_Monday30Septem
ber2002.htm (“The pirates calculate the risks and know the returns far outweigh the chances of getting caught.”).
49. Williams, supra note 41.
50. Id.
51. BLACK MARKET FOR WHITE GOLD, supra note 15, at 7.
52. See Brilmayer & Klein, supra note 37, at 754.
53. IPOA-IUU, supra note 6, §. V.

File: Oppenheim Macro 122704.doc

2004]

Created on: 12/27/2004 1:31 PM

PATAGONIAN TOOTHFISH

Last Printed: 12/27/2004 3:00 PM

303

III. UNCLOS PROVISIONS RELEVANT TO IUU FISHING; CCAMLR
CONVENTION
A. UNCLOS Delineation of Ocean Zones
UNCLOS delineates three main ocean zones and their relevant jurisdictions: the territorial sea, the EEZ, and the high
seas.54 Every coastal state has a territorial sea with a breadth
of twelve nautical miles55 over which that state is sovereign.56
The EEZ, extending two hundred nautical miles from the coastline,57 is the area in which a coastal state has sovereign rights
over the management of its natural resources,58 including jurisdiction over “the protection and preservation of the marine environment.”59
The high seas are defined as “all parts of the sea that are not
included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or
in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of
an archipelagic State.”60 States are prohibited from claiming
sovereign rights to any part of the high seas.61 Their nationals,
however, may fish on the high seas to the extent permissible
under international and regional treaties governing the conservation of the living resources on the high seas.62 Treaties may,
54. See UNCLOS, supra note 8.
55. Id. art. 3 (“Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its
territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from
baselines determined in accordance with this Convention.”).
56. Id. art. 2(1) (“The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its
land territory and internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its
archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial
sea.”). However, a state’s sovereignty over its territorial sea is subject to the
Convention and to other international laws. Id. art 2(3).
57. Id. art. 57.
58. Id. art. 56(1). Although oceans cover approximately 71 percent of the
earth’s surface, 95 percent of the world’s fish are caught within 200 miles of
the coast.
LAWRENCE JUDA, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OCEAN USE
MANAGEMENT: THE EVOLUTION OF OCEAN GOVERNANCE 5 (1996) (citing FAO’s
figures). This fact underscores the importance of controlling overfishing and
IUU fishing within coastal states’ EEZs.
59. UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 56(1)(b)(iii).
60. Id. art. 86.
61. Id. art. 89.
62. Id. arts. 116–18 (Article 116 provides that “[a]ll States have the right
for their nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas subject to: (a) their
treaty obligations. . . .”).

File: Oppenheim Macro 122704.doc

304

Created on: 12/27/2004 1:31 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 12/27/2004 3:00 PM

[Vol. 30:1

for example, impose allowable catch limits on certain species.63
It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between IUU fishing occurring inside a state’s EEZ and permissible fishing on the high
seas. For example, a foreign vessel may hover just outside a
coastal state’s EEZ to capture fish as they swim from within the
EEZ to the high seas.64
B. UNCLOS Dispute Settlement Provisions
UNCLOS dispute resolution mechanisms, found in Part XV of
the Convention, are divided into three basic sections:65 Section
One (General Provisions) authorizes disputing parties to choose
any “peaceful means”66 of dispute resolution, either independently or under a general, regional or bilateral agreement, provided that the resulting decision is binding.67 If the states fail to
peacefully resolve their dispute, they are subject to the options
set forth in Section Two (Compulsory Procedures Entailing
Binding Decisions).68 Under Section Two, states may choose to
bring their dispute before ITLOS, the International Court of
Justice (ICJ), or one of two arbitration tribunals.69 Under
UNCLOS, both the ICJ and ITLOS have jurisdiction to hear
cases requiring the interpretation or application of UNCLOS,
however, parties may not submit the same case to both courts,
nor is forum-shopping permitted.70 However, applications for
prompt release, such as the Volga case, have been heard by the

63. See id. art. 119(1).
64. Brilmayer & Klein, supra note 37, at 752. This may be illegal under
UNCLOS. Id.
65. For a summary of these three sections, see Jonathan L. Hafetz, Fostering Protection of the Marine Environment and Economic Development: Article
121(3) of the Third Law of the Sea Convention, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 583,
632–33 (2000).
66. UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 279.
67. Id. art. 282.
68. Id. art. 286.
69. Id. art. 287(1). However, “unless the parties otherwise agree, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is mandatory in cases relating to the prompt release
of vessels and crews under article 292 of the Convention and to provisional
measures pending the constitution of an arbitral tribunal under article 290,
paragraph 5, of the Convention.” Overview ITLOS, supra note 12.
70. See Tullio Treves, Conflicts Between the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea and the International Court of Justice, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L &
POL. 809, 811 (1999).
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Tribunal.71 Finally, Section Three indicates certain types of disputes that are exempt from Section Two’s compulsory dispute
settlement scheme, which includes disputes over maritime
boundaries, issues before the U.N. Security Council, military
matters, and certain fisheries and marine scientific research
conflicts.72
C. Enforcement Problems
When IUU fishing occurs inside a coastal state’s EEZ, the
state may impose its national laws rather than submit the dispute to UNCLOS’s binding settlement procedures.73 This may
be preferable in instances where a coastal state’s domestic fishing laws are stricter, hence more protective, than those permissible under UNCLOS.74 Some states, however, are unable to
enforce their national fishing laws for lack of financial or technical resources. Others simply choose not to enforce their own
laws. In such situations, IUU fishing goes unchecked, in direct
opposition to the spirit of UNCLOS.75
Another, perhaps obvious, enforcement problem is that states
fail to ratify or implement UNCLOS and other fisheries man-

71. The UNCLOS drafters bestowed on ITLOS the compulsory residual
jurisdiction to interpret prompt release cases, therefore relevant case law will
mostly be found with ITLOS. Erik Franckx, “Reasonable Bond” in the Practice of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 32 CAL. W. INT’L L.J.
303, 309 (2002).
72. UNCLOS, supra note 8, arts. 297–99. See also LEE A. KIMBALL,
INTERNATIONAL OCEAN GOVERNANCE: USING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
ORGANIZATIONS TO MANAGE MARINE RESOURCES SUSTAINABLY 9 (2003).
73. KIMBALL, supra note 72, at 9. UNCLOS provides that:
Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the provisions of this Convention with regard to fisheries shall be settled in
accordance with section 2, except that the coastal State shall not be
obliged to accept the submission to such settlement of any dispute relating to its sovereign rights with respect to the living resources in
the exclusive economic zone or their exercise, including its discretionary powers for determining the allowable catch, its harvesting capacity . . . and the terms and conditions established in its conservation
and management law and regulations.
UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 297(3)(a).
74. See Eichenberg & Shapson, supra note 4, at 607.
75. See Brilmayer & Klein, supra note 37, at 754.
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agement treaties.76 Following the Round Table on the Sustainable Development of Global Fisheries, with Particular Reference to Enforcement against IUU Fishing on the on the High
Seas in June, 2003, the Secretary-General on Oceans and the
Law of the Sea reported that “few States had ratified and implemented these instruments.”77 International instruments that
regulate IUU fishing have, thus, been ineffective “due to a lack
of political will, priority, capacity and resources to ratify or accede to and implement them.”78
Therefore, although dispute resolution mechanisms are
available under UNCLOS and other instruments, enforcement
problems weaken their effectiveness in the battle to end IUU
fishing.
D. UNCLOS Enforcement and Dispute Resolution in Prompt
Release Cases: Article 73(2)
If a coastal state believes a foreign vessel has violated its
EEZ, as Australia did in the Volga case, UNCLOS Article 73(1)
authorizes the coastal state to seize the offending vessel.79 A
coastal state is authorized to board and inspect a vessel, arrest
76. The Pew Oceans Commission urges the United States to ratify
UNCLOS. PEW OCEANS COMM’N, supra note 1, at 80–81. The United States,
however, has taken steps toward enforcing import regulations on toothfish,
and is a CCAMLR member. Journal Staff, Recent Development: A Review of
Developments in Ocean and Coastal Law 2001-2002, 7 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J.
367, 373 (2002). NOAA recently rejected improperly documented toothfish
shipments, in an effort to support international conservation measures. U.S.
Turns Away Improper Patagonian Toothfish Shipments: Clarifies Intent to
Enforce International Conservation Provisions, Press Release No. NOAA04093, NOAA website, Sept. 28, 2004, available at http://www.nmfs.no
aa.gov/docs/04-093_toothfish.pdf. See also Sabrina Tavernise, 3 Are Sentenced
for Smuggling Chilean Sea Bass and Rock Lobster, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2004,
at B6 (reporting that a federal judge sentenced two people to prison for smuggling large quantities of Chilean sea bass and rock lobster).
nd
77. U.N. GAOR, 58 Sess., Agenda Item 53(a) para. 65, U.N. Doc.
A/58/65/Add.1 (2003), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/general_assem
bly/general_assembly_reports.htm (The obstacle to managing global fisheries
in a sustainable way is the “difficulty of enforcing good practice and legal instruments relating to fisheries management on the high seas, especially in
relation to the intractable issue of IUU fishing.”).
78. IPOA-IUU, supra note 6, para. 1.
79. UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 73(1). For the full text of Article 73, see
supra note 24.
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the crew, and implement judicial proceedings against a foreign
party that violates its national fisheries laws.80 If, however, the
coastal state fails to promptly release the vessel once the foreign state has posted a reasonable bond, UNCLOS Article 292
authorizes the foreign state to file an application for prompt
release with the competent court or tribunal.81 This is what
happened in the Volga case; when Russia and Australia failed
to agree on the conditions of release of the Volga and its crew,
Russia filed an application for prompt release with ITLOS.82

80. Id.
81. Article 292 describes the procedures that apply in prompt release disputes:
1. Where the authorities of a State Party have detained a vessel flying the flag of another State Party and it is alleged that the detaining
State has not complied with the provisions of this Convention for the
prompt release of the vessel or its crew upon the posting of a reasonable bond or other financial security, the question of release from detention may be submitted to any court or tribunal agreed upon by the
parties, or, failing such agreement within 10 days from the time of
detention, to a court or tribunal accepted by the detaining State under 287 or to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,
unless the parties otherwise agree.
2. The application for release may be made only by or on behalf of
the flag State of the vessel.
3. The court or tribunal shall deal without delay with the application for release and shall deal only with the question of release, without prejudice to the merits of any case before the appropriate domestic forum against the vessel, its owner or its crew. The authorities of
the detaining State remain competent to release the vessel or its crew
at any time.
4.
Upon the posting of the bond or other financial security determined by the court or tribunal, the authorities of the detaining State
shall comply promptly with the decision of the court or tribunal concerning the release of the vessel or its crew.
Id. art. 292.
82. Conversely, if the disputing states resolve their conflict within ten
days, perhaps under the enforcement provisions of bilateral agreement or
regional convention, UNCLOS prompt release mechanisms do not come into
play. Some disputes end at this stage because the flag state simply prefers to
pay the bond to avoid protracted proceedings.
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E. The CCAMLR Convention
The CCAMLR Convention is a regional treaty that came into
force in 1982 with the purpose of conserving marine life in the
Southern Ocean, while permitting the rational harvesting of
living resources.83 CCAMLR uses scientific advice as a basis for
its conservation measures.84 Its approach is ecosystem-based,
meaning it does not limit its focus to individual species, but
“take[s] into account ecological links between species.”85 Parties to the CCAMLR Convention agree to conduct their harvesting activities in the Southern Ocean in accordance with the
“prevention of decrease in the size of any harvested population
to levels below those which ensure its stable recruitment.”86 To
that end, the CCAMLR Convention designates the quantity of a
given species that may be harvested inside the Convention
area.87 With regard to toothfish, it imposes annual catch limits,
prohibits harvesting in certain ocean areas, requires compliance
with its Catch Documentation Scheme,88 and requires vessels
flagged by CCAMLR member states to use a Vessel Monitoring
System (VMS).89
Unfortunately, CCAMLR’s conservation scheme is impeded in
several ways. First, it is very difficult for member states to police the Southern Ocean, which is vast and inhospitable.”90 Sec83. General Introduction, CCAMLR website, at http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/
e/gen-intro.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2004).
The Southern Ocean surrounds the continent of Antarctica and is
clearly delimited by the Antarctic Convergence (or Polar Front),
which is formed where cold Antarctic waters meet warmer waters to
the north. The Antarctic Convergence acts as an effective biological
barrier, and the Southern Ocean is therefore substantially a closed
ecosystem.
Id. Patagonian toothfish are found primarily in the Southern Ocean and adjacent waters. COLTO Fact Sheet, supra note 15.
84. General Introduction, CCAMLR website, supra note 83.
85. Id. For example, one of the Convention’s early concerns was the effect
of excessive krill catches on other marine life that fed on krill, as well as its
effect on krill populations themselves. Id.
86. CCAMLR Convention, supra note 29, art. II(3)(a).
87. Id. art. IX(2)(a).
88. BLACK MARKET FOR WHITE GOLD, supra note 15, at 8.
89. Id. at 17–18. VMS devices monitor the location of fishing vessels in
order to determine where their catches are made. Id.
90. COLTO Fact Sheet, supra note 15.
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ond, some experts believe CCAMLR’s estimates of the decline in
toothfish populations are conservative, and that some populations are in fact commercially extinct.91
If this is true,
CCAMLR’s current conservation efforts would be insufficient in
light of the actual level of toothfish depopulation. Another obstacle to CCAMLR’s conservation measures is its overall lack of
enforcement capabilities; it cannot punish member states that
violate CCAMLR Convention rules.92 CCAMLR members rely
on “public pressure” to encourage offending nations to comply
with the rules.93 Some members simply fail to enforce the convention’s requirements.94 For example, a flag state may fail to
observe CCAMLR’s toothfish catch limits.95 Finally, other treaties, such as UNCLOS, may restrict the scope of CCAMLR’s
effectiveness. ITLOS’s narrow interpretation of the term “reasonable bond” in prompt release cases limits CCAMLR’s ability
91. BLACK MARKET FOR WHITE GOLD, supra note 15, at 11. Australia nominated toothfish to be listed in Appendix II of the Convention for the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, Report of
the Twenty-First Meeting of the Commission (2002), paras. 10.1–.75 [hereinafter CCAMLR-XXI Meeting], available at http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/pubs
/cr/02/all.pdf. Appendix II includes:
(a) all species which although not necessarily now threatened with
extinction may become so unless trade in specimens of such species is
subject to strict regulation in order to avoid utilization incompatible
with their survival; and
(b) other species which must be subject to regulation in order that
trade in specimens of certain species referred to in sub-paragraph (a)
of this paragraph may be brought under effective control.
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243, art. II(2), available at
http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/text.shtml#I (appendices available at http://
www.cites.org/eng/append/appendices.shtml).
Very recently, CCAMLR indicated that pirate fishing of toothfish in its
convention region significantly declined in 2004. Toothfish Pirates Reducing
the Plunder, Figures Show, N.Z. HERALD, Nov. 12, 2004, available at
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/storydisplay.cfm?storyID=3609369&thesection=ne
rd
ws&thesubsection=general. However, the report of CCAMLR’s 23 annual
meeting, which will presumably provide relevant data, is not available at the
time of this Note’s publication.
92. BLACK MARKET FOR WHITE GOLD, supra note 15, at 18.
93. Eichenberg & Shapson, supra note 4, at 615–16.
94. BLACK MARKET FOR WHITE GOLD, supra note 15, at 18.
95. Eichenberg & Shapson, supra note 4, at 615.
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to enforce CCAMLR Convention conservation measures. In
Volga, for example, ITLOS concluded that Australia could not,
as a condition of release, require the Volga to carry a VMS device and comply with other CCAMLR requirements.96
IV. THE VOLGA CASE
A. Pre-Volga Prompt Release Cases
Since it began hearing cases in 1996,97 six of the Tribunal’s
twelve judgments involved prompt release disputes.98 Volga
was the sixth application for prompt release heard by ITLOS.99
In four of the six cases, a coastal state seized a foreign vessel
containing large quantities of illegally-caught toothfish.100
These cases illustrate the Tribunal’s approach to prompt release disputes, specifically its balancing approach, with which it
weighs the interests of the flag state, which seeks release of its
vessel, against those of the coastal state, which seeks to punish
and deter IUU fishing.
This balancing approach at first appears consistent with the
goal of UNCLOS Article 292, namely to balance the interests of
coastal and flag states.101 This Note argues, however, that the
Tribunal’s balancing approach is flawed. Despite its stated objective to balance the interests of the disputing parties, the Tribunal has invariably undervalued or ignored factors favoring a
96. See infra Part IV.C–D. for an analysis of the Tribunal’s interpretation
of the term “reasonable bond” and the impact of this interpretation on deterring IUU fishing.
97. Frequently Asked Questions (Q & A), ITLOS website, available at
http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
98. See Proceedings and Judgments—List of Cases, ITLOS website, available at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
99. Sarah Derrington & Michael White, Australian Maritime Law Update:
2002, 34 J. MAR. L. & COM. 363, 364 (2003). For a thorough explanation of
how UNCLOS prompt release procedures work, and an analysis of ITLOS’s
interpretation of the term “reasonable bond,” see generally Franckx, supra
note 71.
100. See id. at 311–22. In addition to the Volga case, the prompt release
cases are: The “Camouco” Case (Panama v. France), ITLOS Case No. 5 (2000);
The “Monte Confurco” Case (Seychelles v. France), ITLOS Case No. 6 (2000);
and The “Grand Prince” Case (Belize v. France), ITLOS Case No. 8 (2001). Id.
at 311. These judgments are available at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html
(last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
101. See Franckx, supra note 71, at 305.
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coastal state’s sovereign right to punish IUU fishing within its
EEZ. The balancing approach, moreover, is ill-defined, mutable, and applied inconsistently from case to case to serve the
desired outcome of obtaining the release of a seized vessel.102
Although the Tribunal is in its relative infancy and has heard
only a handful of prompt release cases, these judgments could
hamper the ability of individual states and regional organizations to deter IUU fishing.103 The balancing test is therefore
flawed because it gives insufficient weight to marine life conservation, an essential UNCLOS value, and because it lacks the
specificity needed to provide sufficient notice to states.
B. Facts of the Volga Case and the Dispute over the
Conditions of Release
The Volga was owned by a Russian company, and its master
was a Russian national.104 After Australian authorities boarded
the vessel on February 7, 2002, they informed the master that
the Volga had been apprehended under Australia’s Fisheries
Management Act of 1991 because it had been fishing illegally
inside Australia’s EEZ.105 The master and crew were detained
pursuant to the Act.106 On February 20, 2002, Australia notified
the master that the boat, nets, traps, equipment, and catch had
been seized.107 Three crew members, all Spanish nationals, were
charged with the indictable, strict liability offense of commercial fishing without a license within Australia’s EEZ.108
Russia contended that Australian authorities had violated
UNCLOS Article 72(3) when they set what Russia considered
unreasonable conditions for the release of the Volga and crew.
The conditions for release of the crew, approved by the Full
102. See infra Part IV(C)(3) for more on the inherent inconsistencies in the
Tribunal’s balancing approach.
103. For an analysis of the Tribunal’s balancing approach in Volga, see infra
Part IV.C.
104. The “Volga” Case, para. 2. The Volga’s fishing license required that its
activities comply with fishing industry rules and international agreements.
Derrington & White, supra note 99, at 364.
105. The “Volga” Case, paras. 33–34.
106. Id. para. 35. The master died in an Australian hospital without being
charged with any offense. Id. para. 42.
107. Id. para. 36.
108. Id. paras. 38–39.
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Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia, were:
AU$75,000109 cash for each crew member, the surrender of all
passports and seaman’s papers, and the requirement that the
crew remain in Perth.110 The Volga’s owner posted bail for the
crew.111 The crux of the Volga case, however, was the dispute
over the terms of release of the vessel, which were twofold: Australia demanded a security in the amount of AU$3,332,500 and
imposed additional, non-financial conditions.112 As non-financial
conditions of release, Australia required the Volga to carry a
VMS during the course of the legal proceedings, and to observe
CCAMLR conservation rules.113 The boat’s owner rejected Australia’s conditions of release as unreasonable, and agreed only
to post the considerably lower amount of AU$500,000.114 The
Tribunal ultimately held that the bond for release of the Volga
should be AU$1,920,000,115 representing the value of the vessel,
109. On February 1, 2002, one Australian dollar equaled .51 U.S. dollars.
Currency Converter, Bank of Canada, at http://www.bank-banque-canada.ca/
en/exchform.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2004).
110. The “Volga” Case, para. 41.
111. Id. para. 42. Russia, however, maintained that the terms of release of
the crew were “not envisaged by article 73(2)” and thus “not permissible or
reasonable in terms of the Convention.” Id. para. 48.
112. Australia set the following conditions of release for the Volga:
[A] security to be lodged amounting to AU$ 3,332,500, for release of
the vessel. The security amount is based on what Australia considers
reasonable in respect of three elements:
- assessed value of the vessel, fuel, lubricants and fishing equipment
- potential fines
- carriage of a fully operational VMS [Vessel Monitoring System] and
observance of CCAMLR . . . conservation measures until the conclusion of legal proceedings.
Id. para. 53. The AU$3,332,500 security consisted of the value of the vessel,
fuel, and lubricants (AU$1,920,000); potential fines imposed on crew members
pending criminal proceedings (AU$412,500); and security for the VMS system
and observance of CCAMLR rules (AU$1,000,000). Id. para. 72. Australian
authorities sold the 131,422 tons of toothfish found on the Volga for nearly
two million Australian dollars, which they held in trust pending the outcome
of legal proceedings. Id. para. 51.
113. Id. Recall that both Russia and Australia were CCAMLR members
and were therefore required to carry VMS equipment. See supra text accompanying note 17.
114. The “Volga” Case, para. 54.
115. Id. para. 90.
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fuel, and lubricants, and rejected Australia’s additional, nonfinancial conditions.
C. The Tribunal’s Balancing Approach: The Question of
Reasonableness
In Volga, the Tribunal had to determine whether the bond
and conditions set by Australia were reasonable under
UNCLOS Article 73(2).116 UNCLOS does not define the term
“reasonable.”117 The Tribunal characterizes its task in prompt
release cases as to determine whether a prompt release claim
against a detaining state is “well-founded.”118 To that end, the
Tribunal developed its balancing approach.
In Volga, the Tribunal had to balance the Russian Federation’s contention that the conditions of release of the vessel and
crew were unreasonable119 against Australia’s position that the
bond was reasonable based on “the value of the Volga, its fuel,
lubricants and fishing equipment; the gravity of the offences
and potential penalties; the level of international concern over
illegal fishing; and the need to secure compliance with Australian laws and international obligations pending the completion
of domestic proceedings.”120 To determine the reasonableness of
the requested AU$3,332,500 security, the Tribunal considered
factors it had deemed relevant in prior prompt release cases, in
particular: “the gravity of the alleged offences, the penalties
imposed or imposable under laws of the detaining State, the
value of the detained vessel and of the cargo seized, [and] the
amount of bond imposed by the detaining State and its form.”121
The Tribunal did not intend this list of factors to be exhaus-

116. Id. paras. 58–61.
117. See Franckx, supra note 71, at 306–09. ITLOS’s Rules of the Tribunal
provide that the Tribunal’s task in prompt release cases is to determine
whether a claim that a detaining state has not complied with prompt release
provisions is “well-founded,” and if well-founded, the “amount, nature and
form of the bond or financial security.” Id. at 308.
118. Id. (citing the Tribunal’s Rules).
119. The “Volga” Case, para. 60.
120. Id. para. 61.
121. Id. para. 63 (citing the judgment in the “Camouco” case (2000)). Because Article 292 disputes are subject to obligatory third-party settlement,
usually by ITLOS, case law on the reasonableness criterion will tend to be
consistent. See Franckx, supra 71, at 325–26.
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tive.122 Rather, the assessment of reasonableness was to be
made on a case-by-case basis.123
1. Gravity of the Offense
The Tribunal failed to allocate sufficient weight to the gravity
of the Russian Federation’s offense, namely IUU fishing of a
fragile species. Moreover, it did not articulate a clear basis for
rejecting the two indications of gravity asserted by Australia:
first, the potential penalties for IUU fishing within Australia’s
EEZ, which constituted evidence that Australia considered IUU
fishing a serous matter, and, second, that IUU fishing was a
problem of significant international concern, particularly in the
CCAMLR Convention region, where there was a “serious depletion of the stocks of Patagonian toothfish ….”124
After conceding that the offenses were grave125 and that international fishing concerns were a factor in its balancing test, the
Tribunal nevertheless suggested that these concerns were neither dispositive nor necessary to the balancing equation.126
Gravity was, rather, an ancillary or optional factor that the Tribunal “may” consider when evaluating the reasonableness of
penalties.127 The Tribunal implied that it deemed itself precluded from considering the gravity of the offense in a meaningful way because it perceived its primary “purpose” to be securing the prompt release of the Volga.128 To secure prompt release
of the vessel, then, the Tribunal would need to downplay factors
supporting Australia’s position. This approach invariably favors the foreign state’s interests over those of the detaining
state: the imposition of any bond or condition of release that
122. The “Volga” Case, para. 64 (citing the judgment in the “Monte Confurco” Case (2000)). The Tribunal emphasized in Monte Confurco that it did
not wish to “lay down rigid rules as to the exact weight to be attached to each
of them.” Id.
123. See id. para. 65 (citing the Monte Confurco case).
124. Id. para. 67.
125. Id. para. 68 (“The Tribunal takes note of the the submissions of the
Respondent. The Tribunal understands the international concerns about
illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing and appreciates the objective
taken by States, including the States Parties to CCAMLR, to deal with the
problem.”). Id.
126. See id. para. 69.
127. Id.
128. See id.
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interferes with prompt release will be given insufficient
weight.129 It would seem, therefore, that the Tribunal’s balancing test is flexible to the point of being illusory. One is left to
wonder whether the Tribunal is giving mere lip service coastal
states’ sovereign rights under UNCLOS to manage marine resources within their EEZs.
2. Non-financial Conditions of Release
The Tribunal construed the term “bond or other security” in
Article 73(2) to exclude non-financial conditions.130 It pointed to
the text of Article 292 and other UNCLOS provisions in which
appears the term “bond or other financial security” for the “context” and concluded that the “object and purpose” of this language in Article 73(2) dictated nothing more than purely financial conditions.131 To support this conclusion, the Tribunal observed that, had the UNCLOS drafters intended to permit nonfinancial conditions of release, they would have written them
into the Convention.132 The Tribunal, thus, restricted its inquiry
to a plain meaning textual analysis. It declined to consider
whether a coastal state is “entitled” to impose non-financial
conditions under the Convention “in the exercise of its sovereign
rights.”133 Perhaps the task of reconciling Australia’s sovereign
rights under UNCLOS with the mandates of Articles 73(2) and
129. The Tribunal was equally dismissive of the gravity of the offense factor
in pre-Volga prompt release cases:
[W]ith respect to the other relevant factors, namely the gravity of the
offences and the range of penalties applicable, the Tribunal usually
simply states that it “takes note” of the submissions made, without
any further indication of the weight given to the evidence or elements. Especially in the Monte Confurco Case this technique sharply
contrasted with the considerable efforts of France to develop the argument regarding gravity of the offense [sic] before the Tribunal.
Franckx, supra note 71, at 336–37.
130. The “Volga” Case, para. 76. (“In these proceedings, the question to be
decided is whether the ‘bond or other security’ mentioned in article 73 paragraph 2 of the Convention may include such conditions.”).
131. Id. para. 77. Article 73(2) does not contain the qualifying word “financial” where it refers to the “other security,” whereas Article 292(1) contains
the term “other financial security.” For the full text of these provisions, see,
respectively, supra notes 24 and 81.
132. The “Volga” Case, para. 77.
133. Id. para. 76.
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292 was too daunting. Instead, the Tribunal narrowly construed Articles 73(2) and 292.
3. The Balancing Approach Offers Poor Guidance to
UNCLOS Member States
The balancing test, as articulated and applied by the Tribunal in the Volga line of cases, offers poor guidance to national
judges who set the amount of bond on a seized vessel.134 Similarly, the test is a poor guide for national legislatures charged
with setting the guidelines for their courts. The risk is that,
despite the dire need to deter IUU fishing, judges and legislatures will act cautiously by setting low bonds, in order to avoid
the inconvenience of prompt release disputes, in anticipation of
losing such disputes, or simply out of confusion with regard to
the meaning of the term “reasonable bond.” In this sense, the
effect of the Tribunal’s standard of reasonableness in prompt
release disputes, to the extent one can be defined, is contrary to
the conservationist spirit of UNCLOS with respect to IUU fishing.135
134. In the prompt release cases that preceded Volga, the balancing test
lacked cohesiveness, and thus was a poor guide to states:
The interaction among the different relevant factors, the fact that the
list of factors is said to be non-exhaustive, and the Tribunal’s manifest refusal to clarify the interrelation of the factors, have made a
horizontal analysis of the different cases, in order to try to discern
some predictability for future cases, a very difficult, if not impossible,
exercise.
Franckx, supra note 71, at 337. Consequently, there is a danger that the Tribunal’s loose guidance will make it easier for national courts to manipulate
the factors in its balancing test to come up with their desired result:
The lack of precision, caused by the unwillingness of the Tribunal to
narrow further the general contours set thus far, could nave a negative influence on national judges who might try to “misuse” the broad
framework created by the Tribunal. Members of the Tribunal have
noted that “national adjudication bodies welcome this guidance”….
Franckx, supra note 71, at 338. A national judge must apply domestic fishing
laws and also comply with the standard expressed in international instruments. See Bernard H. Oxman & Vincent P. Bantz, International Decision:
The “Camouco” (Panama v. France) (Judgment). ITLOS Case No. 5, 94
A.J.I.L. 713, 720 (2000) (criticizing a French judge’s failure to invoke
UNCLOS in his reasoning when determining the amount bond in the
Camouco case, when under French law treaties trump statutes).
135. In his Separate Opinion, Judge Cot explained:
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D. Separate and Dissenting Opinions to the Volga Case
It is reassuring that several members of the Volga Tribunal
acknowledge that illegal fishing of toothfish is a grave offense,
and that the majority’s holding will likely impede coastal states’
efforts to combat it. In his Separate Opinion, Judge Jean-Pierre
Cot emphasized the need to “clarify the difficulties encountered
by States in combating [IUU fishing] in the Southern Ocean.”136
He articulated a specific concern for the plight of toothfish, and
an awareness that the majority’s ruling may frustrate
CCAMLR’s efforts to protect toothfish.137 Judge Cot’s reference
to the financial lure of toothfish poaching138 underscored the
need for stinging financial penalties, in the form of hefty bonds.
Unlike the majority, Judge Cot emphasized Australia’s legitimate sovereign rights under UNCLOS to take necessary enforcement and deterrence measures to combat IUU fishing inside its EEZ.139 These rights include the right to determine ap-

CCAMLR’s verdict on the devastation caused by illegal fishing in the
region is damning. The proceeds of illegal fishing appear to be
greater than those of licensed fishing—at least that was CCAMLR’s
estimate for the 1997/98 season—and therefore more than double the
level of catches regarded as the maximum to ensure the preservation
of the species. If the parties to the Convention do not manage to put
an end to these practices, stocks of Patagonian toothfish will be completely wiped out within about ten years.
The “Volga” Case, Separate Opinion of Judge Cot, para. 6 (2002), available at
http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
136. Id. para. 2.
137. See supra note 135.
138. The Volga
achieved an illegal catch of 100 tonnes of Patagonian toothfish in
nine weeks, which was sold by the Australian authorities for the sum
of AU$ 1,932,579, while the vessel, its fuel oil and its fishing gear
were estimated at AU$ 1,920,000. . . .With a full hold, the fish caught
illegally in the course of a fishing season are worth more than twice
the price of the vessel.
Id. para. 7.
139. According to Judge Cot:
The measures taken by Australia, both in terms of prevention and enforcement, clearly fall within the scope of the efforts made by international organizations to combat [IUU fishing]. They come under article 56 of [UNCLOS] and have been taken in pursuance of the sovereign rights exercised by coastal States for the purpose of exploring,
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propriate monetary penalties, the amount of which UNCLOS
neither limits nor defines.140 The Tribunal, Judge Cot points
out, should not interfere with these sovereign rights.141
Judge Cot, however, drew the line at the form of bond a state
may impose, agreeing with the majority’s conclusion that
UNCLOS Articles 73(2) and 292 authorize a coastal state to set
a bond or security that is strictly financial in nature, but not
non-financial conditions.142 The effect of such non-financial conditions, he reasoned, might upset the tension between the
rights of coastal and flag states, by giving the coastal state additional “coercive power.”143
Judge Ad Hoc Ivan Shearer, in his dissenting opinion, agreed
with the opinions expressed by Judge Cot,144 but went one step
further.145 With regard to the monetary amount of a bond or
security permissible under UNCLOS, Judge Shearer concluded
that “illegal fishing must be punished with a high and deterrent
level of monetary penalty.”146 To support this conclusion, he
emphasized that the Volga had the capacity to hold 275.6 tons
of fish, so that its potential illegal catch greatly exceeded the

exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources of the
[EEZ].
Id. para. 11.
140. Id.
141. Id. para. 12 (“The Tribunal has a duty to respect the implementation
by the coastal State of its sovereign rights with regard to the conservation of
living recourses, particularly as these measures should be seen within the
context of a concerted effort within the FAO and CCAMLR.”). However, a
state may not take arbitrary actions within the scope of its sovereign rights.
Id.
142. The “Volga” Case, Separate Opinion of Judge Cot, para. 26. Australia
required that the Volga be equipped with a VMS device and respect CCAMLR
regulations. See supra note 112, and accompanying text.
143. Id.
144. The “Volga” Case, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ad Hoc Ivan Shearer,
para. 12.
145. It is worth noting the significance of there being more than one dissent
in the Volga case: “This was not a lone dissent (so often the fate of the ad hoc
judge), and that makes it more difficult, however large the majority, to dismiss the merits of the opinion. Judge Anderson dissented too, and for largely
similar reasons.” Ryszard Piotrowicz, The Song of the Volga Boatmen—Please
Release Me, AUSTRALIAN L. J., 160, 162 (2003).
146. The “Volga” Case, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ad Hoc Ivan Shearer,
para. 11.
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actual catch found on board, or 131 tons of toothfish;147 that, as
parties to UNCLOS and the CCAMLR Convention, Australia
and Russia were required to conserve living resources; and that
it is difficult for states to patrol the Southern Ocean, where
weather is “bleak and cold, with high winds and heavy seas.”148
On the question of the permissibility of non-financial conditions of release, Judge Shearer faulted the majority for its “narrow interpretation” of the provisions of Articles 73(2) and 292.149
He pointed out that Russia had, in fact, quantified in monetary
terms the requirement that the Volga carry a VMS.150 There is,
then, a financial component to this condition, which could be
considered a form of bond.151 Judge Shearer further observed
that even a narrow interpretation of the terms “bond” and “financial security”152 does not necessarily preclude non-financial
147. Id. para. 6.
148. Id. paras. 9–10.
149. Id. para. 17.
150. Id. para. 16. Note, too, that the majority’s characterization of the bond
imposed by Australia accords financial values to each of the non-financial
conditions of release:
- a security to cover the assessed value of the vessel, fuel, lubricants
and fishing equipment (AU$ 1,920,000);
- an amount (AU$ 412, 500) to secure payment of potential fines imposed in the criminal proceedings that are still pending against
members of the crew;
- a security (AU$ 1,000,000) related to the carriage of a fully operational VMS and observance of CCAMLR conservation measures.
The “Volga” Case, para. 72.
151. The “Volga” Case, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ad Hoc Ivan Shearer,
para. 16. (“Even though [Australia] quantified this requirement in monetary
terms at AU$ 1,000,000 it has nevertheless been regarded by the Tribunal as
a non-financial security since it is essentially in the nature of a “good behaviour bond” for the future. . . .”).
152. Judge Shearer criticizes the majority’s narrow interpretation of Articles 73(2) and 292:
In the short period since the conclusion of the Convention in 1982,
and in the even shorter period since its entry into force in 1994, there
have been catastrophic declines in the stocks of many fish species
throughout the world. The words “bond” and “financial security”
should be given a liberal and purposive interpretation in order to enable the Tribunal to take full account of the measures—including
those made possible by modern technology—found necessary by many
coastal States (and mandated by regional and sub-regional fisheries

File: Oppenheim Macro 122704.doc

320

Created on: 12/27/2004 1:31 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 12/27/2004 3:00 PM

[Vol. 30:1

“associated conditions that are not of themselves financial in
nature.”153 He analogized that requiring a vessel to carry a VMS
device is similar to the practice of national criminal courts that
set bail conditions in an effort to deter recidivism.154 For example, an individual released on bail might be prohibited from certain conduct as a condition of release.155 It is unclear whether
Judge Shearer found support for this analogy implicit in the
text of UNCLOS, or as an extension of customary national practice or international customary law, or simply as a matter of
common sense.
Finally, Judge Shearer compared the authentic French text of
Article 73(2) to the English language version, observing that the
literal meaning of the French version “imported a wider margin
of appreciation for the setting of bonds by national authorities
than that imported by the word ‘reasonable’….”156
Judge David H. Anderson, in his dissenting opinion, concluded that a literal reading of Article 73(2) does, in fact, permit
non-financial conditions of release of the Volga.157 First, he
found that Article 73 “contains no explicit restriction upon the
imposition of non-financial conditions for release of arrested
vessels.”158 He further found that, although the term “other seorganisations) to deter by way of judicial and administrative orders
the plundering of the living resources of the sea.
Id. para. 17.
153. Id. para. 18 (in which Judge Shearer refers to and concurs with Judge
David H. Anderson’s analogy to national criminal procedure). See also The
“Volga” Case, Dissenting Opinion of Judge David H. Anderson, para. 13.
154. The “Volga” Case, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ad Hoc Ivan Shearer,
para. 18.
155. Id.
156. Id. The French version of 73(2) refers to “une caution ou une garantie
suffisante.” Id. One translation of this phrase is “an adequate bond or security” (author’s translation). This Note does not offer a comprehensive statutory analysis of Articles 73 and 292. For such an analysis, including how the
meaning of “reasonable bond” may differ according to the six authentic language versions of UNCLOS, see Franckx, supra note 71, at 326–30. See also
Oxman & Bantz, supra note 134, at 716–17. Cf. The “Volga” Case (including
dissenting opinions of Judges Anderson and Shearer, and the Separate Opinion of Judge Cot).
157. The “Volga” Case, Dissenting Opinion of Judge David H. Anderson,
para. 7.
158. Id. (“Where the Convention does limit the rights of coastal States in
the matter of enforcement, it does so in express terms: article 73, paragraph 3,
prohibits imprisonment and corporal punishment.”).
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curity” probably refers to a financial security,159 the term “bond”
has both a financial and legal meaning.160 Where Article 73 is
concerned, “bond” has the legal meaning associated with criminal procedure, as opposed to a purely financial meaning associated with investment matters.161 Judge Anderson illustrated his
point by analogy to the setting of bail bonds under U.S. States
and English domestic law; both allow the inclusion of conditions.162 Thus, when the Tribunal assesses the reasonableness
of a given bond, it should examine the reasonableness of three
elements: the amount, form and conditions of the bond.163 A
non-financial, “good behaviour bond” with the legitimate purpose of deterring additional poaching by a released vessel would
therefore constitute a bond within the literal meaning of Article
73(2).164
V. ARGUMENTS FAVORING A BROADER INTERPRETATION OF
ARTICLE 73(2)
It is too soon to predict the impact the opinions of judges Cot,
Shearer, and Anderson on future ITLOS prompt release cases.165
Judge Anderson optimistically suggested that, with the Volga
case, the Tribunal had “gone further than it did in the Monte

159. Id. para. 8.
160. Id. para. 9.
161. Id. para. 10.
162. Id. paras. 12–13.
163. Id. para. 14.
164. Id. para. 20. Judge Anderson indicates that the use of a “good behaviour bond” would be justifiable in the Volga case because the Volga appeared
likely to re-offend; it apparently ignored warnings issued by Australian authorities and “spent much of the period between its warning and its arrest
fishing in the CCAMLR Area, including the EEZ.” Id. para. 22(a). Moreover,
were the Volga released, “it may well be nigh impossible to keep track of the
Volga in Antarctic waters, including the Australian EEZ, especially if it is not
carrying VMS.” Id. para. 22(e).
165. Ryszard Piotrowicz concludes:
This is an important decision. It shows the potential for a clear division in the tribunal with regard to the meaning of reasonable bonds.
Until now a majority, six out of 11, of the cases before the tribunal,
have concerned prompt release. It is therefore very likely that the issue will arise again and soon. Judges Shearer and Anderson have
given their colleagues plenty of food . . . for thought.
Piotrowicz, supra note 145, at 163.

File: Oppenheim Macro 122704.doc

322

Created on: 12/27/2004 1:31 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 12/27/2004 3:00 PM

[Vol. 30:1

Confurco case two years earlier.”166 Whereas in the earlier case
the Tribunal “simply took note”167 of the detaining state’s concerns over the serious situation caused by IUU fishing, in
Volga: “[t]he Tribunal understands the international concerns
about [IUU Fishing] and appreciates the objectives behind the
measures taken by States, including the States Parties to
CCAMLR, to handle the problem.”168 But, no matter how understanding and appreciative the Tribunal may be, the majority’s
narrow reasoning does not imply a change of course. To the
contrary, the Volga case stalls the creation of a judicial precedent under which coastal states may impose high, deterrent
penalties and additional, non-financial conditions of release.169
A. The Impact of Volga on the IUU Fishing of Toothfish
As the Volga case demonstrates, the Tribunal’s focus is predominantly procedural with regard to reasonable bond disputes,
to the detriment of the overall spirit and substance of UNCLOS.
This undermines coastal states’ ability to deter IUU fishing by
imposing meaningful financial penalties.170 In the case of toothfish, poachers clearly find it worthwhile to risk typical penal-

166. The “Volga” Case, Dissenting Opinion of Judge David H. Anderson, at
para. 2.
167. Id.
168. The “Volga” Case, para. 68. In the Camouco judgment, which preceded
the Monte Confurco case by several months, the Tribunal likewise simply
“[took] note of the gravity of the alleged offences,” without acknowledging IUU
fishing and efforts to prevent toothfish poaching. The “Camouco” Case (Panama v. France), ITLOS case No. 5, para. 68 (2000). Moreover, the Tribunal
“failed to reveal precisely how the amount of the bond was determined, [although] the Tribunal did identify the factors it took into account.” Oxman &
Bantz, supra note 134, at 720. In the Grand Prince case, the Tribunal never
reached a discussion of the gravity of the offense, finding on a separate issue
that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the application. The “Grand Prince”
Case (Belize v. France) ITLOS Case No. 8, para. 93 (2001).
169. See Gorina-Ysern, supra note 8, at 676–77.
170. The risk of excessive, arbitrary, or discriminatory penalties is offset by
certain UNCLOS provisions. For example, UNCLOS prohibits discrimination
when setting allowable catch rates and other conservation measures for the
high seas: “States concerned shall ensure that conservation measures and
their implementation do not discriminate in form or in fact against the fishermen of any State.” UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 119(3).
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ties.171 Moreover, after the Volga case, Australia and other
coastal states might be inclined to refrain from imposing higher
bonds if the amount, if contested before ITLOS, is likely to be
struck down. Finally, if the Tribunal continues to interpret Article 73 in a way that disfavors national and regional conservation regulations, such as Australian laws and CCAMLR Convention rules, efforts to sustain toothfish populations are likely
to fail.
B. Defending the Tribunal’s Approach
The Tribunal is relatively new. UNCLOS entered into force
in November, 1994, and the ITLOS bench was elected in 1996.172
It handed down its first prompt release decision in 1997, the
M/V Saiga case.173 In M/V Saiga, the Tribunal set a “low burden” standard for the flag state to meet in order to prevail in its
application for release.174 This legal standard arguably “does
violence to the balance the Convention strikes concerning the
scope of permissible third-party oversight of coastal state activities in their EEZs, making it too easy to subject coast state detentions of foreign flag vessels to international judicial review.”175
However, the Tribunal may have been justified in
playing it safe. Perhaps it is unreasonable to expect a fairly
new court to “assert bold and innovative interpretations of the
Convention”; it is understandable that it would “exert its authority only incrementally.”176 Even CCAMLR members have
expressed deference to ITLOS, despite its rulings on the prompt
release cases.177 Some scholars, placing a high value on consis171. See Swashbuckling Customs, supra note 46; COLTO Media Alert, supra note 46.
172. John E. Noyes, Law of the Sea Dispute Settlement: Past, Present, and
Future, 5 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 301, 303 (1999).
173. The “M/V Saiga” Case (Saint Vincent & the Grenadines v. Guinea),
ITLOS Case. No. 1 (1997), available at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html
(last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
174. See Noyes, supra note 172, at 307.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 307–08.
177. CCAMLR-XXI Meeting, supra note 91, para. 8.67. Sweden stated that:
ITLOS has just begun its work, but it has dealt with several cases
concerning prompt release of vessels. If there is a legal development
within the praxis of the Tribunal in respect of what is to be consid-
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tency and efficiency in jurisprudence, praise the Tribunal’s
work in prompt release cases for having those attributes.178 Finally, the Tribunal faces a difficult task. UNCLOS is difficult
to interpret and apply because it is “built upon the compromise
and accommodation of the different interests at stake, and is
therefore deliberately ambiguous in many respects.”179
C. Arguments For and Against Amending Article 73(2) of
UNCLOS
If we accept the Volga court’s view that the Tribunal is constrained from liberally construing the term “reasonable bond,”180
then perhaps the focus should shift from interpreting the
Convention to amending it.
It is possible that the Convention’s drafters foresaw neither
the vast collapse of fish populations nor the extent to which
IUU fishing would increase. During the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea between 1974 and 1982,181
non-coastal states raised the issue of fishing rights to surplus
populations living inside the coastal states’ EEZs. Because they
debated what to do with surplus fish populations, it appears
that, at the time, states did not seriously contemplate the potential extinction of these resources.182 Perhaps they did not
ered as a “reasonable bond,” and which praxis is considered to be detrimental to efforts to combat illegal fishing, this is something that
has to be dealt with in the context of ITLOS’ own jurisprudence. It is
the view of Sweden that it is important to have confidence [in] the
UNCLOS system and in the work of the Tribunal.
Id.
178. See Tim Stephens & Donald R. Rothwell, Case Note, The Volga (Russian Fed’n v. Australia), I.T.L.O.S. No. 11 (Dec. 23, 2002), 35 J. MAR. L. &
COM. 283, 291 (2004) (“The speed and efficiency with which the Tribunal handled this case demonstrates its effectiveness in such cases. This can only lead
to further confidence in its ability to address prompt release matters.”).
Stephens and Rothwell, nevertheless, acknowledge that the Tribunal appeared to ignore the serious and widespread problem of IUU fishing in Australia’s EEZ, in violation of Australian fisheries laws and CCAMLR conservation efforts. Id. at 288.
179. Marcos A. Orellana, The Law on Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: ITLOS
Jurisprudence in Context, 34 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 459, 462 (2004).
180. The “Volga” Case, para. 76.
181. JUDA, supra note 58, at 213.
182. Id. at 217 (“Should the emphasis of the EEZ regime be on some concept
of full utilization of resources, requiring that others be allowed to fish in those
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envisage advances in fishing technology that would facilitate
IUU fishing.183 Had they foreseen today’s decline in some living
marine resources, the UNCLOS drafters might have modified
Article 73 to unambiguously allow coastal states greater discretion to deter IUU Fishing within their EEZs. Perhaps, too, the
drafters did not anticipate the high cost to coastal states of
monitoring and patrolling EEZs,184 which now justifies demanding high bonds in exchange for the release of rogue vessels.
UNCLOS provides procedures for amending the Convention.185 At the Twenty-First Meeting of CCAMLR in 2002,
members debated the pros and cons of amending Article 73(2).186
Australia submitted a proposal to amend Article 73(2) to exempt vessels that were detained for IUU fishing in the
CCAMLR Convention Area.187 This would prevent such vessels
from re-offending after posting bond188 pending the resolution of
litigation on the merits.
The response to Australia’s proposal was decidedly lukewarm. Several participating countries expressed concern that
the amendment procedure would be protracted and complicated.189 France worried that it might entail the inconvenience
of “having to appear before the tribunal in Hamburg, Germany.”190 The United Kingdom tempered its sympathy for the
Australian initiative with doubts that the proposed amendment
instances in which the coastal state could not utilize all of the available
catch….”).
183. According to Earle,
In the decade since the 1982 convention, advances in fishing technology, from the deployment of thousands of miles of lightweight, inexpensive drift nets to the use of sophisticated sonar and even satellite
observation techniques to locate populations of fish and squid, have
led to swift and devastating reductions in what once seemed to be
“limitless” populations.
EARLE, supra note 1, at 162.
184. The “Volga” Case, Separate Opinion of Judge Cot, at para. 9.
185. UNCLOS, supra note 8, arts. 311-16. Prior to submitting a proposed
amendment, a period of ten years from the date of entry into force must expire. UNCLOS entered into force in November, 1994, therefore this ten-year
period has recently expired.
186. CCAMLR-XXI Meeting, supra note 91, paras. 8.62–.73.
187. Id. para. 8.62.
188. Id.
189. Id. paras. 8.63, 8.66, 8.71.
190. Id. para. 8.71.
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would fix the problem.191 If Article 73(2) were eliminated, a
coastal state would no longer be obligated to release a vessel on
bond, which could have consequences for the detaining state if
the Tribunal later determined that the vessel was not guilty of
IUU fishing; the detaining state might have to pay considerable
compensation for keeping the boat in port.192 The United Kingdom was also concerned that such an amendment might be contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention, namely to
“strik[e] a very careful balance between the rights of Coastal
States and the rights of fishing states, and Article 72(3) is part
of that balance.”193
Other states endorsed the United Kingdom’s “cautious” approach,194 articulating conservative or passive positions. Sweden, commenting that UNCLOS “is a package deal,”195 which
balances the rights of flag states and coastal states, concluded
that there is too great a risk of disturbing the balance by
amending Article 73.196 Neither Sweden nor the United Kingdom wished to second-guess or offend ITLOS.197 Chile suggested
that, rather than amend UNCLOS, “if ITLOS decisions continued to constitute a cause for concern, the matter could be raised
in other forums, such as the U.N. Oceans Consultation,
UNCLOS Parties Meeting, or as intervening States at ITLOS
proceedings.”198 France found the proposed amendment “disproportionate in relation to the problem” without further explanation.199

191. Id. para. 8.64.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. paras. 8.62–.73.
195. Id. para. 8.67.
196. Id.
197. Id. para. 8.64 (“We also think it may send the wrong message as to our
faith in [ITLOS], an institution set up by UNCLOS. If States think ITLOS is
taking the wrong approach, the correct place to raise that issue is within the
tribunal.”). See also id. para. 8.67 (“It is the view of Sweden that it is important to have confidence in the UNCLOS system and in the work of the Tribunal.”).
198. Id. para. 8.65.
199. Id. para. 8.71.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Tribunal and CCAMLR should revisit the idea of amending Article 73(2) in greater depth and provide coastal states
with specific, alternative solutions before Patagonian toothfish
are both off our dinner plates and gone from the oceans.200 At
the very least, an in-depth assessment of Australia’s proposed
amendment is in order. Perhaps there is a way to amend Article 73(2) without completely abolishing it. This Note proposes a
less drastic revision. For example, Article 73(2) could be
amended to unambiguously permit additional, non-financial
conditions of release, provided they are reasonable under the
facts of a given conflict. Further, the amendment could permit
higher financial bonds or securities in the case of repeat offenders or large-scale IUU fishing operators.
CCAMLR should, at the very least, investigate Chile’s alternative suggestions, or devise others. Pending an amendment or
other international solutions, Australia has increased domestic
fines for illegal foreign fishers201 and taken the bold step of sending an armed ship to patrol its waters to deter toothfish poachers.202 Meanwhile, it remains to be seen how ITLOS will app-

200. It is not the purpose of this Note to assess CCAMLR’s efficacy. However, for criticism of this organization, see generally BLACK MARKET WHITE
GOLD, supra note 15; Media Release, Australian Toothfish Industry Slam
International Meeting Outcomes, COLTO, Nov. 13, 2004, available at
http://www.colto.org/TFIndustry_MR_13_November03.htm (last visited Nov.
18, 2004); Popick, supra note 19, at 961–85; CCAMLR: The Convention for the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, Greenpeace International,
at http://archive.greenpeace.org/oceans/southernoceans/expedition2000/morein
fo/bg_ccamlr.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2004).
201. Australia Boosts Fines for Illegal Foreign Fishers, AlertNet, REUTERS
FOUNDATION, Nov. 26, 2003, available at http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/
newsdesk/SYD68601.htm (“The proposed new laws would also allow the Australian government to recover the cost of pursuit and apprehension of foreign
illegal fishing vessels.”).
202. Australia Arms Toothfish Patrol, BBC News, supra note 14.
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roach its next prompt release judgment. By then, sadly, it may
be too late for the toothfish.
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